Problems with Universalism, Part 1

The doctrine of universal salvation is plagued by theological difficulties. Even more important, it offers untenable interpretations of a large number of biblical texts. In part 1 of this series I will address the theological problems of universalism. In part 2 I will look at its exegetical problems.

Universalism’s major theological problem is that it denies the freedom of God’s grace and makes human salvation a moral obligation for God. If the way universalists argue their case is correct, then God could have done nothing other than save all morally corrupt sentient beings (fallen angels and humanity). Had he done otherwise, he would have compromised his justice severely.

This is what Friend (a universalist who commented on the previous post) wrote:

“Since Scripture reveals God to be all-powerful, all-wise and all-loving, how can any of us really accept that this powerful, wise and loving God will fail to save all, but instead, will punish the great majority of mankind in a terrible hell, and that without any remedial purpose?”

This is exactly the kind of presupposition that we must not bring to Scripture, because it is a presupposition that places an obligation on God. Historically, the church has long taught that grace is, by definition, a free gift of God, not an obligation. Arguments about the love of God that universalists employ hoist a philosophical perspective on what kind of love God must have, and to what extent he must show it. But this is to stack the deck before ever looking at the text of Scripture. Talbott does this in his chapter in the book Perspectives on Election. Actually, Talbott would disagree with me, arguing that he takes the statement “God is love” (1 John 4:8, 16) as his theological paradigm to understand the nature of God’s love. However, the statement in and of itself must be interpreted in its Johannine context, and this is something Talbott does not address with any kind of adequacy. Instead, he immediately proceeds to erect a philosophical definition of the love of God that goes something like this:

If God is love, then he must love all people and angels in exactly the same way to the highest degree.
God is love.
Therefore, God loves all people and angels in exactly the same way to the highest degree.

The funny thing about this is how Talbott stumbles so ridiculously over the clear teaching of Scripture. Somehow, he argues that God’s statement, “Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated” (Malachi 1; quoted in Romans 9) actually means, “Jacob I loved, and Esau I loved the same.” He is working with an a priori definition of the love of God, one that obligates God to save humanity. This presupposition leads him to the most fanciful kinds of exegetical gymnastics. Given his theological methodology, however, this is not surprising. Talbott says that, up front, he will reject any teaching that strikes him as “darkness.” It is no wonder we see exegetical gymnastics when we come to difficult passages that would strike just about any Western, democratically inclined mind as “darkness.”

I don’t have the book handy right now, but I also remember a number of statements made by Talbott to this effect: if even one person remains unreconciled to God for eternity, that will call everything else (God’s love, God’s justice) into question. Again, this is telling God the way it has to be instead of bowing before him as an undeserving sinner and thanking him that, though he could have justly left the entire human race in sin and sent us all to hell, he freely chose to make his glory known through the redemption of some. The first lesson in salvation is this: God didn’t have to do it. Universalists don’t seem to understand this.

I think Karl Barth’s driving concern to protect the freedom of God is what kept him from becoming a clear, open advocate of universalism. Many of Barth’s statements lead us to believe that he advocated universal redemption, but in the end he would not come out unambiguously on the issue because for him, to do so would be to limit God with an obligation above himself. Now, I believe God does have obligations (Barth would probably disagree). God is obligated to be true to his holy character. He is obligated to keep his Word. But he is not obligated to save anyone. What I mean by this is that he is not obligated to save us unless he obligates himself. I believe he has obligated himself to the elect through his own freely spoken, sovereign word of promise. But he could have refrained from making these promises and still have been completely just, holy, righteous, and yes, even loving (Love has been expressed eternally to an infinite degree within the Trinity; even if all humanity spent eternity in hell, love within the Trinity would not change.). I doubt that Talbott would agree with that statement, and that is why his version of universalism leads to a massive theological problem.